Vietnam War

The Vietnam War: Congress versus Presidency

The Vietnam War has been the major focus of many researches and papers till today. The significance of this war is that it imposed a defeat on the United States that had just left behind World War II successfully and proudly. America was not involved in the war from the beginning, but when it entered into the war, leaving it seemed impossible. Many politicians and thinkers have discussed the reasons and effects of this war but what made me interested in this subject was the way it influenced Congress-presidency relation. Difference of opinion between Congress and presidents on how to handle the war, and presidents’ abuse of power shook the balance of power between the two and led to many debates and conflicts in their relations.

War: the Background

When Japan left Indochina after its defeat in 1945, the former French colony celebrated its independence under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. Shortly after, in 1946, France entered into a war with the newly independent Vietnam that lasted for 8 years; that is until 1954 when France withdrew into South Vietnam (Zinn, 2005). So when did America enter into the war? According to Zinn (2005) America began aiding France after 1949, during Truman’s presidency. These aids that were at first in the form of money and arms and then accompanied by human forces, enhanced to a degree that “by 1968, the combat operations had become so Americanized that the natural tendency of many of south Vietnamese leaders was simply to hold back and let the Americans do it” (Anderson, 2005, p. 471).

Paris ended using force against Vietnamese nearly a year after Eisenhower became president. So then it was only America that provided aid to Vietnamese opponent in South Vietnam. (Anderson, 2005). As Stephen Ambrose in “Eisenhower, The President” stated that “the real roots of the Vietnam war lies in the policies of Eisenhower administration adopted toward Southeast Asia after 1954- policies that exercised an enormous influence not only under Eisenhower but under Kennedy and Johnson as well” (as cited in Kentleton, 2005, p. 779). In 1953, in his address to Congress, he characterized the French war against Vietnam as holding “the line of freedom” against “communist aggression throughout the world” (Anderson, 2005, p. 22). He then supported Diem Regime in South Vietnam but it was a mistake because Diem was not popular. He was a catholic and close to landlords while most Vietnamese were Buddhists and peasants (Zinn, 2005).in his New Look Strategy, he had committed to Americans to reduce national defense expenditure (Anderson, 2005) but he failed. America was permitted to send only 685 military advisors to Southern Vietnam under Geneva Accords, but Eisenhower sent several thousand and Kennedy increased the figure to sixteen thousand (Zinn, 2005). When Kennedy took office in 1961 the Diem Regime was still weak and insecure (Anderson, 2005). He actually made little changes in US policies in Southeast Asia and continued that of Truman and Eisenhower (Zinn, 2005). Johnson who became the president after Kennedy’s assassination favored an atmosphere of people’s support of the war in the beginning (Friedman, 1999). He was weak in foreign policy and in issues regarding the Vietnam war that was “the first and essentially all-consuming foreign policy crisis of his presidency” (Kentleton, 2005, p. 777), he “constantly asked his advisors how much US military aid was enough” (Anderson, 2005, p. 43). He appeared successful in selling Vietnam to the public (Kellner, 2002); just consider his State of Union Addresses in 1965 and 1967.

 In 1965 the justifications he brought for America’s involvement in the war was “first because a friendly nation has asked us to help against communist aggression....Second, our own security is tied to the peace I Asia”; and in 1967 he said: “This is a time of testing for our nation. The question is whether we have the staying power to fight a very costly war, when objective is limited and the danger to us is seemingly remote”. The SEATO treaty and the 1962 Geneva Accords were also used as further justifications.  (Friedman, 1999)

But from 1965 to 1968 when people saw the increasing financial and human costs of the war, their opinion began to change. He had turned the US involvement in Vietnam into a major war. He had started the process of Americanization of the war with a full human force and material support for South Vietnam (Anderson, 2005).

My mid-1960s the presidential power had grown extensively and thus possibilities of abuse of power had increased. L. B. Johnson and Richard Nixon made the full use of their position and power and “fell to this temptation” (McKay, 2004, p. 188).

Nixon maybe was the president who created the most controversies in Congress- president relations. He was elected in 1968 by promising the American voters to win an honorable peace in the Vietnam and he tried to direct any blame for failure to the weakness of others and especially Congress (Anderson, 2005). As Grant (2004) stated “the major expansion [of presidential power] has undoubtedly taken place since 1930s and the excesses of Nixon presidency came as a culmination of 40 years of executive development” (p. 95).

Now, given an overall picture of the war and the presidents who were in the office in that era, we can start with the main conflict: Congress- president relations during Vietnam War.

Congress versus Presidency

“One of the oldest conflicts in the American system of government is that between congress and the president over the right to formulate and implement foreign policy” (Tower, 1981). This conflict grow more intense when America was becoming known as a world power or better to say the world power after World War II. In this era America was facing increasing emergencies and threats so the atmosphere was good for the presidency to become more powerful because “the president can act more swiftly than Congress in an emergency” (Manley, 1971, p. 70). Manley (1971) also spoke of a “repeated tendency for the American people to unite behind the president” when there is an international crises (p. 69). Besides, in the American society, Presidency is the most “publically visible” institution and “only the president is perceived as national leader and defender of the public interest” (McKay, American politics and society, 2004, p. 186). For a president to be successful, public support is very important. If any president loses it he will certainly face more oppositions from Congress, his own administration and the media (Grant, 2004).According to Fleisher et al.(2000), in the period between World War II to mid 1960s some “political and institutional advantages” made the president more powerful than Congress in foreign policy-making so the only thing that Congress was expected to do in its relations with the president was “to defer” to him; no matter he was from the minority party or from the majority, congress supported him on “foreign and defense issues” (p. 21); note that “from 1953 through 1972 minority presidents won an average of 82% of foreign and defense votes” (p. 11). Now let’s go to the advantages they discussed:

First, the immediacy of the Cold War and nuclear threat required strict secrecy to protect the security of the nation. The need for secrecy gave the president a tremendous information advantage over members of Congress. Second, during the post- World War II period, there was general agreement in both parties of the need to vigilantly guard against Soviet adventurism. Third, these considerations led to the perception that the United States should speak with a singular voice on the world stage. The president was best suited to express that voice. In this context, there was a widely held belief that congressional assertiveness might undermine the U.S. position in the world and therefore damage national security (p. 5).

When it comes to national security, Congressmen often cooperate with the president more and are “reluctant to do anything that might be said to undermine the president” (Grant, 2004, p. 94). Such a situation happened during America’s involvement in the Vietnam War. “It was a civil and an interstate war as well as an irregular and a conventional war” (Kalyvas & Kocher, 2007, p. 189).

To see how the Congress-president relation was in this period let’s start with having a look at the 90^th Congress (1967-1968) declaration:

The Congress hereby declares:

1)      Its firm intentions to provide all necessary support for members of the armed of the United State fighting in Vietnam;

2)      Its support of the efforts being made by the president of the United States and other men of good will throughout the world to prevent an expansion of the war in Vietnam and to bring that conflict to an end through a negotiated settlement which will preserve the honor of the United state, protect the vital interests of this country, and allow the people of south Vietnam to determine the affairs of that nation on their own way ; and

3)      Its support for the convening of the nations that participated in the Geneva Conference or any other meeting of nations similarly involved and interested as soon as possible for the purpose of pursuing the general principles of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 an for formulating plans for bringing the conflict to an honorable conclusion (Friedman, 1999).

When America entered into the Vietnam War, Congress could not oppose sending supplies and arms to the troops already in the battle because then it would be blame for endangering lives of the American soldiers. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was one of the attempts made by Congress to get in line with the president. This resolution that expanded “ the United States’s[sic] military  involvement in Vietnam” was passed in the House “by a vote of 416 to 0”  and in the Senate “by a vote of 88 to 2” (Souva & Rohde, 2007, p. 113). It “gave the president the power to initiate hostilities without the declaration of war by Congress that constitution required” (Zinn, 2005, p. 476) But how long did this cooperative and peaceful relationship last? Not so long.

Grant (2004) in The American Political Process spoke of “Honeymoon period” that is the “period often relatively short after a president takes office, when he experiences harmonious relations with Congress, the media and the public” (p. 309). For example Nixon enjoyed a “74%” of victory of Congressional votes in 1969 when he took the office, but in 1972 it was 66% and 1974 it was reduced to “59.6%” (Grant, 2004, p. 63). These “harmonious relations” would be replaced by rivalry when the president forgets about the limits to his power and begins to tip the balance in his favor. Of course, the president’s appeal for more power is more seen in foreign affairs rather than domestic issue. That is why Wildavsky spoke of “two presidencies”, one for domestic and one for foreign affairs saying that “in the realm of foreign policy” the president is always the winner when he is “serious and determined” (as cited in Manley, 1971, p.63). Arthur Schlesinger in “Imperial Presidency” discussed that in the post-World War II, “American presidents began to make foreign policy without reference to the legislature” (as cited in McKay, Houghton, & Wroe, Controversies in American politics and society, 2002, p. 57).

 Vietnam War was one of the periods when imperial presidents were in the office. In response, Congress passed some acts and resolutions and in one case used the impeachment to contain the enhancing power of the presidents. These containing attempts by Congress reached its pick in late 1960s and early 1970s, final years of the Vietnam War. The war actually produced an atmosphere of distrust between the two branches (Fleisher, Bond, Krutz, & Hanna, 2000).

Congress then began to restore “the balance of power”; as a first step toward such a restoration “the Senate passed the National Commitment Resolution in 1969” in which it “resolved that for a national commitment involving the use or potential use of American forces to be valid, it must be approved by Congress through treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution” (Manley, 1971, p. 68). Then in December 16, 1969, Congress “prevented further use of money in Laos”, the same ban extending to Cambodia with “Church-Cooper Amendment” that was passed in Senate on June 30, 1970, and signed by Nixon in January 1971 (Walsh, 2007). According to Julian Zelizer, the Church-Cooper Amendment was “the first successful use of congressional budgetary authority to limit the war” (as cited in Walsh, 2007). 18 proposals were considered by Congress to restrict funding for military operations in Indochina from 1970 to 1973 (Walsh, 2007). Another example is the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment that “required Nixon to withdraw all American forces from Vietnam by the end of 1971” (Kirstein). It was passed in neither House of course, but “39 senators” supported it. Kirstein stated that “during Vietnam, it was the Senate and not the House of Representatives that attempted to constrain the military action of an imperial presidency” and these examples show us that he could be right.

In 1973 “congress voted to cut off all funds for the air war in Cambodia- the on remaining ‘stick’ the US had” (Anderson, 2005, p. 111). But one of the most powerful reactions on the part of the Congress was the “War Powers Resolution” in 1973. It actually prevented the presidents from “waging war unilaterally” (McKay, Houghton, & Wroe, 2002, p. 59).” The War Powers Resolution basically requires any president who sends US troops abroad to consult Congressional leaders first, and then submit a written report justifying the action to the leadership of both the House and Senate within forty-eight hours of the troop’s deployment. The president can then leave the troops where he has placed them for sixty days....If in that time Congress approves the commitment of troops... the president can continue the military initiative he has begun [if not, he had to withdraw his troops]” (McKay, Houghton, & Wroe, 2002, p. 60)

Conclusion

The crisis and pressures that the Vietnam War imposed on the American society had a great influence on the relations between two important branches of government: Congress and Presidency. The major conflict between the two was over the extent of control in foreign policy affairs. The presidents of the time abused their power and excluded the role of the legislative branch in the process of decision-making with sending troops to Vietnam secretly, waging war unilaterally, and creating a situation in which congress had no choice but to bend to the presidents’ will. The reaction of the congress to this excessive execution of power differed in different period of the war. At the beginning of the war the congress often approved of presidents’ decisions. Even some acts laws and resolutions were passed in Congress that expressed full support for president like gulf of Tonkin resolution. But the costs and length of the war increased day by day and thus the public began to oppose the war. As Grant (2004) stated Americans’ trust in the federal government has experienced a considerable decline since 1960s. Public opinion shows that in 1966, 11% of Americans had a “great deal of confidence” in the executive branch, but in 1976 it was only 11%; 30% decrease over a period of 10 years (Anderson, 2005). In such an atmosphere Congress found the opportunity to impose more pressure on the presidents to withdraw American troops from Vietnam and generally to recognize the limits to the presidential power. The South Vietnamese defeat had negative effects also on Americans’ self-confidence (Fukuyama, 2006). The debates and disagreements at home finally led to America’s failure in Vietnam. As Craige (1996) put it: “ The Vietnam war was lost by the United States because it was too long, too visibly bloody, too costly, too much debated” (Craige, 1996, p. 111). So not only Vietnam war caused controversies inside the American system of government , but these controversies also later influenced the process of war. If America was more united at home, it would have gained better results abroad.

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